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ABSTRACT
In an era of legislative gridlock, policy by administrative action has expanded, with major
swings occurring when the political party of the presidency changes. These policy disputes have
spilled into the third branch with a concomitant increase in legal challenges seeking judicial
review of such actions. At the same time, both Republican and Democratic Administrations have
made cost-benefit analysis the currency of federal rulemaking in the executive branch.
The combination of the expansion of cost-benefit analysis and the increased litigation over
rulemaking has increased the importance of economic and scientific justifications in both the
promulgation and revision of administrative actions. However, despite their importance to the
administrative process, the actual economic and scientific analyses which underlie cost benefit
studies are often not at the front and center of regulatory action or of legal challenges. To more
transparently understand the legality of administrative actions and thus to push for better
regulatory actions, these underlying data should be better presented in agency actions. Though
attorneys may not believe themselves well versed in the minutiae of such studies, underlying
economic and scientific data should be analyzed closely in any legal rulemaking challenges.
Administrative decisions that rely on an improper use of data or on flawed data are likely to be
arbitrary and capricious, which could void a rulemaking and/or provide support for its repeal or
replacement.
In this article, we use the economic analyses accompanying the Trump Administration’s
National Waters Protection Rule rulemaking under the Clean Water Act as a case study to
demonstrate the importance of such data and administrative actions and discuss approaches for
how to accommodate this moving forward.

Nicholas S. Bryner is an Associate Professor of Law and John P. Laborde Endowed Professor of Energy Law at
Louisiana State University’s Paul M. Hebert Law Center, and Victor B. Flatt is Dwight Olds Chair in Law and the
Faculty Co-Director of the Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources (EENR) Center at the University of
Houston Law Center. Thanks to Stephanie Wartelle, LSU Law ’21, for research assistance on this article, and to
participants in the 2021Vermont Law School Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship for suggestions and
feedback. Also thanks to JB Ruhl, Stephen Dycus, Jonas Monast, Michael Vandenbergh, Shelley Welton, Hannah
Wiseman, Mary Jane Angelo, Blake Hudson, Shi-Ling Hsu, Hope Babcock, Donald Hornstein, Jonathan SkinnerThompson, Nathan Richardson, and the participants of the Southern Environmental Law Scholarship.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Executive branch agencies are central to how law affects our society and its citizens. As
those agencies make decisions, legal challenges to federal rulemaking follow “as the night the
day.” 2 Whether or not these challenges are successful, changing Presidential Administrations are
likely to continue to repeal and replace rules enshrining policy not to their liking. But the typical
challenge to administrative actions, particularly rulemakings, usually only involves an
examination of the text of the rulemaking itself, with occasional reference to how the agency has
responded to comments and sometimes a look at underlying data (if it can be accessed). But this
is the equivalent of “kicking the tires,” a superficial look at all of the construction that goes into
the creation and promulgation of a rule. It turns out that some of the details “under the hood” are
just as important, and sometimes even more so, than the exterior of the process. Getting “under
the administrative hood” is an important process of understanding and supporting or challenging
agency action. And therefore we need a new process to give us that “look.”
Statutes and administrative policies have made cost-benefit analysis preeminent in justifying
the rationality of both proposing and replacing rules. 3 Because legal challenges to agency action
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) frequently turn on the rationality or
reasonableness of the action given the administrative record and the weight of the information
before the agency, the economic and scientific underpinnings of such administrative actions are
ever more important. 4 As our Supreme Court moves to restrict agencies’ flexibility in

William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3.
See infra Part II.B (recounting the history of cost-benefit analysis in presidential administrations since the 1970s).
4
See, e.g., Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (laying out the standard formulation of the
APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” test from 5 U.S.C. § 706).
2
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interpreting statutory language and implementing their congressional mandates, the rulemaking
process and information supporting that process may carry even more weight in legal disputes. 5
Yet this information is often buried in the agency process and is thus often ignored or glossed
over in the high-profile legal challenges to major rules.
This article shines a light on this critical deficiency and proposes that requirements be put in
place to make this information available, by examining the role that economic and scientific
analysis played in the important National Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”), promulgated under
the Trump Administration. 6 Despite the high-intensity policy jockeying over the scope of the
Clean Water Act, which has been ongoing for fifty years, 7 the economic analyses that provided
the basis for justifying the agency’s policy change (and the assumptions behind those analyses)
were not featured in the rulemaking text itself. Thus, the original legal challenges to the Trump
rulemaking did not directly focus on the flaws in the economic analyses accompanying the repeal
of the prior (Obama-era) rule and its replacement with the NWPR. But, as shown by an analysis
by the External Environmental Economics Advisory Council, these analyses had significant
deficiencies which called into question the rulemaking’s legality. The information brought to
light by the study may yet provide the policy rationale for a new WOTUS rule; but more
importantly, it shines a critical light on just how important these analyses are across the

See W. Virginia v. EPA, decided June 30, 2022, at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/201530_n758.pdf.
6
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers & U.S. EPA, The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the
United States,” 85 FED. REG. 22,250 (2020). The rule was vacated by an Arizona District Court in August 2021 after
the Biden Administration requested voluntary remand to reconsider the agencies’ position. See Pascua Yaqui Tribe
v. United States Env't Prot. Agency, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Ariz. 2021).
7
The dispute in the NWPR dates to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500,
70 Stat. 498, which is commonly referred to as the “Clean Water Act.” The 1972 statute defined the term “navigable
waters,” relevant to the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction under the Act, as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), and subsequent administrative action and litigation in the
past half century has addressed the meaning of that phrase. See infra Part III.A.
5
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administrative landscape. 8 This demonstrated importance then demands a new way to make this
information available.
In four years, the Trump Administration made rolling back environmental and health
regulations its priority, 9 focusing heavily on the costs of these regulations while minimizing their
benefits. Within the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), three major rollback actions stand
out as particularly consequential. First, and providing the linchpin example for this article, the
EPA redefined the scope of the “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) that are protected under
the Clean Water Act, placing the majority of the nation’s wetlands outside the jurisdiction of the
Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA’s permitting process and leaving them vulnerable to
degradation and pollution. 10 Second, the EPA replaced the Obama Administration’s Clean Power
Plan—regulation of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from coal- and natural gas-fired power
plants—with afar less ambitious rule, referred to as the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule. 11
Third, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration revised and weakened
the standards for GHG emissions and fuel efficiency in new motor vehicles through the so-called
“SAFE” Rule. 12 In the case of the motor vehicles rule, new cost-benefit analyses provided the
primary rationale for the change in policy; for the others, the agencies used cost-benefit analysis

In January 2022, the Supreme Court granted review of a case which examines the Congressional intent for Clean
Water Act jurisdiction. Sackett v. EPA, No. 21-454, cert granted, 595 U.S. ___ (Jan. 24, 2022),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012422zor_m6io.pdf. What the court rules in the Sackett case
might counter some regulatory flexibility in this particular situation, but the lessons from the rulemaking are still
relevant.
9
For a list of regulatory actions in this field, see Harvard Environmental & Energy Law Program, Regulatory
Rollback Tracker, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
10
Dep’t of Defense & EPA, The Navigable Waters Rule Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United
States”, 85 FED. REG. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020).
11
U.S. EPA, Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 84 FED. REG. 32,520 (2019), vacated by Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985
F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021), reversed sub nom West Virginia v. EPA (U.S. June 30, 2022).
12
NTHSA & EPA, Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule (SAFE), 85 FED. REG. 24,174 (2020).
8
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as a significant supplementary justification for the Administration’s change in statutory
interpretation.
Each new administration has the power to put its policy stamp on the nation. However,
the actions agencies take to lay out and implement these policies must be legal. Each of the
Trump environmental regulatory rollbacks spawned series of lawsuits (many successful) from
coalitions of states and environmental and health advocacy groups. 13 These lawsuits have tended
to focus on two main categories of legality: first, the proper scope and interpretation of
administrative agencies’ statutory authority to regulate specific environmental matters; and
second, the inadequacy or irrationality of the agencies’ stated justifications for rolling back the
environmental protections.
Both of these types of issues are squarely within the scope of judicial review of
administrative agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act, with which attorneys are
familiar. 14 With respect to statutory authority, scholars and judges have expounded a multitude
of theories and justifications for differing degrees of agency latitude in reading statutes. For
almost the last forty years, the courts have relied on the Chevron two-part deference test, but
more recently the Supreme Court has also imposed limits on agencies’ statutory interpretation by
applying the “Major Questions Doctrine,” which presumes that Congress does not grant broad authority
to an executive branch agency in an area “of vast economic and political significance” without explicit,
clear instructions. 15

See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (ACE Rule), reversed West Virginia v. EPA
(decided June 30, 2022), at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf.
14
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D).
15
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); W, Virginia v. EPA, (decided June 30, 2022), at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf See also Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 142
S. Ct. 661 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct.
2485 (2021). These latter two cases were both decided on the Court’s “shadow docket,” effectively halting Covid13
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In addition, over the past several decades, the rise in agency procedural requirements
requiring data—with legislative, executive, and judicial origins rooted in statutes, executive
orders, and case law—has enabled advocates to challenge the substance of agency regulatory by
challenging documents of the relevant scientific and economic information behind each
decision. 16
Legal advocates challenging the increasing administrative rollbacks or administrative
repeal and replacements, which have mushroomed in the last decade, can benefit from digging
deeper into the details of agencies’ economic analysis— but that digging is difficult because that
data is usually not presented in the rulemaking itself.
This Article focuses on the Trump WOTUS rule changes, in particular, as a case study of
how a review of the economic assumptions behind a rule can unearth potential legal
vulnerabilities, and thus why it is important to make that data more readily accessible in the
rulemaking process. How agencies conduct regulatory impact analysis and display that
information has broad implications. Based on the lessons of the WOTUS rule and other recent
changes to environmental regulations, we proffer recommendations for improving the
rulemaking process to address the oversight of both agency practice and of White House-led
centralized review of the regulatory process.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, we introduce the basics of federal agency
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, judicial review of agency actions under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, and the development of regulatory impact analysis. Second, we
related agency regulations. The Supreme Court has thus far not overruled Chevron, but has declined to apply it in
situations where previous iterations of the Court might have been expected to do so. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Becerra, 596 U.S. ___ (Jun. 15, 2022) (striking down an agency interpretation of statutory language regarding
Medicare reimbursements without any mention of Chevron).
16
See infra Part II.
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discuss the role of economic modeling and scientific data in that process. Third, we present the
WOTUS case study, detailing the regulatory history and the economic analysis that undermines
the Trump Administration’s justification for its rulemaking effort. Fourth, we consider the
lessons of the WOTUS rule in context, which provides insights into how policymakers might
better design oversight of the regulatory process and the use of cost-benefit analysis in decisionmaking, and make it more transparent in the rulemaking process. It is our view that current
administrative practice fosters a failure to examine underlying scientific and economic analyses,
and that this can lead to a woefully inadequate understanding of a particular rulemaking. To
effectively understand what economic or scientific data supports a rulemaking, that information
must be made more accessible, and then attorneys can better understand potential deficiencies
when reviewing complex rules.

II.

AGENCY RULEMAKING BASICS

In 1946, Congress established a code of procedures and standards for administrative agency
decision-making: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 17 The APA followed a period of
rapid expansion of federal agency authority over economic regulation in the New Deal era.
Decades of practice and judicial decisions have added additional layers, at times creating clearer
standards for agencies to follow and at other times muddying the waters.
Under the APA, major regulations fall in the category of “rules,” defined in the statute as
“agency statement[s] of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 18 The APA provides two pathways for
17
18

5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.
Id. § 551(4).
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rulemaking to create regulations that carry the force and effect of law: “formal” rulemaking that
follows agency hearings with trial-like procedures 19 and “informal” or “notice-and-comment”
rulemaking, which, despite the name, does involve specific statutory steps. 20 Courts, statutes, and
agencies have sharply limited the circumstances in which “formal” rulemaking is used, finding
the format inappropriate for the types of prospective, generally applicable regulations that
predominate in agency practice. 21
Section 553 of the APA lays out the steps for informal rulemaking: (1) notice provided to the
public of a rulemaking proposal via publication in the Federal Register; (2) opportunity given to
the public to comment on the proposal; and (3) publication of the agency’s final rule. 22 Congress
has added to these requirements for certain general categories of decisions based on their
impacts, and agency-specific statutes may also require additional procedural steps. 23
Two aspects of administrative rulemaking are of particular importance here in discussing
legal challenges to regulatory rollbacks. First, under the APA, persons or organizations that are
adversely affected may seek judicial review of “final agency actions,” which include the final
products of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 24 Courts review agencies’ substantive decisions
under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, which affords deference to agency expertise but
provides a pathway for reviewing the reasonableness and rationality of those decisions. 25
Second, beginning in the 1980s, a series of presidential executive orders has required agencies to

Id. §§ 556-557.
Id. § 553.
21
See, e.g., United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 274 (1973).
22
5 U.S.C. § 553.
23
Examples of general requirements that apply across the federal government include, for example, the National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (requirement to prepare a “detailed statement” on the
environmental impact of proposed agency actions); the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.; and the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq.
24
5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704.
25
Id. § 706(2)(A).
19
20
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prepare a regulatory impact analysis for major rules, which has led to the rise of agency costbenefit analysis and the centralization of government-wide review of regulatory policy by White
House staff. 26 The development of these requirements has led to the production of additional
scientific and economic data in support of rulemaking that may provide the crux of evidence
supporting the administrative action and thus are relevant in judicial review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard.

A. Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Judicial Review
Section 706 of the APA instructs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.” 27 Case law has reduced this to the common shorthand of “arbitrary
and capricious” review. 28

1. The Basics: Review Under Overton Park
In the seminal Overton Park case, the Supreme Court explained that this test goes beyond a
simple inquiry as to whether agencies have acted within the scope of their authority (although

The era of centralized Presidential direction of agency cost-benefit analysis began in earnest under President
Reagan in 1981. Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). Predecessors of this order include President
Carter’s call for review of “significant rules” and President Ford’s “inflation impact analysis.” See Exec. Order
12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (1978) (Pres. Carter); Exec. Order 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41501 (1974) (Pres. Ford).
27
Id.
28
See, e.g., Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (referring repeatedly to the “arbitrary and
capricious” test).
26
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that is an important element of APA judicial review 29). 30 Although arbitrary and capricious
review is deferential to agency expertise—“[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency”—the Overton Park Court emphasized that it “must consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment.” 31
Section 706 requires that courts “review the whole record” that agencies develop in their
decision-making process. 32 Following Overton Park, courts have applied greater scrutiny to
informal agency decisions, requiring agencies to take greater steps to develop a written record
showing the reasoning for such decisions. 33 This has been the case whether the decision in
question is, like the approval of the highway in Overton Park, an “adjudication” (a decision
made by determining facts and applying the law and regulations to a particular set of
circumstances), or a “rule” of general applicability. 34

2. Changed Positions: Review of Rescinded and Amended Rules
The APA definition of “rule” includes not only the formulation of a rule but also an
amendment to or rescission of an existing rule. 35 Therefore, when an agency seeks to roll back
29
5. U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) directs courts to invalidate agency actions “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.” Thus, the question of whether action is “arbitrary” and “capricious” under
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA is distinct from whether the agency has acted consistent with its statutory authority.
30
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The case dealt with review of the Department of
Transportation’s approval of an interstate highway expansion in Memphis, Tennessee.
31
Id. at 416.
32
5 U.S.C. § 706.
33
For example, in 2021, when the Supreme Court upheld an FCC decision to repeal and/or amend three rules on
media ownership, the bulk of the Court’s opinion explaining its deference to the FCC focused on the “significant
record evidence” that the agency had put together (even though there were disputes about the validity of some of the
data sets the FCC had relied on in reaching its conclusions). FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project (U.S. April 1, 2021),
slip op. at 8.
34
The APA provides the distinction between these categories of agency actions in 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)-(7).
35
Id. § 551(4).
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regulations, the APA requires the agency to follow the same notice-and-comment process,
subject to the same arbitrary and capricious review. 36 Many of the Trump Administration’s array
of rollback efforts ran into this procedural roadblock: in 2017, in particular, courts struck down
move after move made by the EPA and other agencies to forestall, delay, or walk back Obamaera regulations without following informal rulemaking requirements. 37
In the State Farm case, the Supreme Court laid out four points that represent the heart of
the Court’s arbitrary and capricious inquiry for rulemaking:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. 38
In that case, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rescinded an
earlier regulation that had required automobile manufacturers to include “passive
restraint” safety features (either automatic seatbelts or airbags). 39 The agency in its redo
under the Reagan Administration concluded that automatic seatbelts—which the
overwhelming majority of automakers had opted for—would not result in the anticipated
safety benefits. 40 However, the Court noted an obvious solution that the agency had
apparently not considered: simply mandating the installation of airbags, which would

See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard and holding that “the direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial
review established by law.”)
37
See Bethany Davis Noll & Alec Dawson, Deregulation Run Amok: Trump-Era Regulatory Suspensions and the
Rue of Law (Institute for Policy Integrity 2018), available at
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Deregulation_Run_Amok_Report.pdf.
38
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
39
Id. at 38.
40
Id. at 47.
36
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respond to the purported problem and would seemingly better protect drivers and
passengers. 41
According to the APA text 42 and to foundational Supreme Court decisions, 43 there is no
formal difference between the level of scrutiny that courts apply to the rescission or amendment
of a rule and the scrutiny applied to a new rule created from scratch. But as a practical matter,
there will almost always be differences in how courts evaluate these two types of situations
because the presence of an existing regulatory policy or position adds contextual information that
is available to both the agency officials in making rule changes and to the judges in reviewing
them.
In FCC v. Fox, Justice Scalia rejected the idea that an agency has the burden to
demonstrate that its new, changed position or rule is more reasonable than an earlier one or that
its prior position was unreasonable. 44 The Court’s test since that time has been the same: the
agency must simply show that the decision was the result of an adequate, reasoned decision
making process. 45 However, it is not difficult to see that in many cases, it is impossible to do the
latter—demonstrate reasonableness—without also showing a shortcoming in the former rule that
justifies the move to change course.

Id. at 46-48 (“Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the agency, the mandate of the Safety Act
to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to
require the installation of airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving the objectives of the Act should
have been addressed and adequate reasons given for its abandonment.”)
42
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), 706.
43
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
44
Id. at 514 (“[O]ur opinion in State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy
change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance.”)
45
Justice Scalia applied Section 706 and State Farm to hold that there is still a difference between the more
deferential review of agency’s decision not to act in the first place under Section 706(1) and review of a
promulgated regulation or decision under Section 706(2), but concluded that review of the agency’s first and second
crack at a rule should be the same once an initial decision to act had been made. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 514-15.
41

12
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Take, for instance, the ongoing controversy about the federal government’s greenhouse
gas emissions and fuel economy standards for new motor vehicles. 46 The relevant statue, the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, requires NHTSA to set fuel economy standards at
the “maximum feasible average fuel economy level” for each model year. 47 During the Obama
administration, the EPA and the NHTSA issued a joint rulemaking setting the target for the
average car at 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. 48 In 2020, the Trump administration finalized a
rule that lowered the target significantly. 49 In order to reasonably show that the new, lower
standard meets the statutory requirement of “maximum” feasibility, the agencies necessarily
must claim that the earlier level was unreasonable or that changed circumstances have rendered it
unreasonable. 50 Such instances demonstrate that once the agency has established a regulatory
policy, the figurative bell cannot be easily “un-rung.”
One reason courts have given deference to agencies in the arbitrary and capricious
standard is that there is an asymmetry of information in the regulatory process. Bureaucratic
decision makers are the technical, subject matter experts, and courts ought not substitute their
judgment for that of the agency. 51 Comparing a brand new rule with a previously existing

See EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 FED. REG. 24,174 (2020).
47
49 U.S.C. § 32902(a).
48
EPA & NHTSA, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 FED. REG. 62,624 (2012). The 54.5 mpg number reflected values in testing
conditions rather than “real-world” usage and represented what would be achieved if full compliance under the
standard were done by making fuel efficiency improvements. In other words, the expected average to be achieved
would have been less, but the number is useful for comparison purposes. See id. at 62,642.
49
EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 FED. REG. 24,174 (2020).
50
EPA Administrator Michael Regan announced in April 2021 that the Biden Administration would be revising the
GHG and fuel economy standards for cars. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Stephen Lee, EPA Chief Vows Tougher
GREEN,
Apr.
6,
2021,
Tailpipe
Rules
by
July,
Unwinding
Trump’s,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-06/epa-chief-vows-tougher-tailpipe-rules-by-july-unwindingtrump-s. In May 2022, NHTSA revisited the issue and finalized a rule for model years 2024-2026, the remainder of
the time period that the Trump Administration’s less stringent rule had covered. See NHTSA, Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards for Model Years 2024–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 87 FED. REG. 25,710 (2022).
51
See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
46
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regulatory vacuum is difficult, and judges in those circumstances have little to go on in
determining whether an agency is acting reasonably. But once a rule has been put in place, the
court now has a basis for concrete comparisons. Even though, doctrinally speaking, the agency
does not need to disprove the reasonableness of a prior position, the old rule and everything that
led up to it all remains part of the agency’s record. 52 There can be no adequate, reasonable way
for an agency make a new decision without considering the process, data, and analysis that led to
the old rule.
Although arbitrary and capricious review remains a deferential standard, it provides a
substantive legal check on the administrative decision-making process, ensuring that the outcome
is rational and encouraging transparency in agencies’ reasoning. It provides an opening for courts
to look at the connection between the record an agency has created and the agency’s ultimate
decision. That is, when the data, analysis, and information before an agency are thorough,
arbitrary and capricious review should weed out “bad” decisions unsupported by the record. But
that is not all: judicial review also opens up the possibility of looking at the content of that record
and the quality of the economic and scientific analysis upon which agencies base their regulatory
decisions. An agency process that relies on evidence that is unreliable or that “[fails] to consider
an important aspect of the problem” fails the test. 53
As we discuss below, the rise in regulatory impact analysis and cost-benefit analysis
means that more information and economic data will be available in the record on judicial review
of agency actions. The case study of the Trump Administration’s WOTUS rule demonstrates the

52
Courts review agency decisions on the basis of the “whole record” and on the reasoning that the agency provides
at the time the decision is made (i.e., not acknowledging any post hoc rationale). See 5 U.S.C. § 706; SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) [Chenery I] (holding that “the grounds upon which the administrative agency
acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained”).
53
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
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importance of this information—and the need to make this information easily available in order
to assess the reasonableness of agency actions under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test.

B. The Rise of Regulatory Impact Analysis
During the “environmental decade” of the 1970s, the U.S. Congress enacted several of the
landmark statutes that form the backbone of federal law on the protection of the environment and
public health. Throughout the decade, the Environmental Protection Agency and other
administrative agencies acted in far-ranging ways to implement the new and expanded Clean Air
Act, Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and
other statutes.
New regulations had predictable and unpredictable impacts on economic activity as
industrial sectors became subject to the new statutes’ provisions. The 1970s “first generation” of
environmental statutes focused explicitly on scientific and public health criteria for establishing
the level of regulation—in some cases to the exclusion of economic concerns. 54 Antiregulatory
pressures quickly arose. Since that time, deregulatory advocates have repeatedly employed
economic-based rhetoric to oppose environmental, consumer protection, or health and safety
regulations by framing regulatory proposals as pitting “jobs” vs. “the environment” or some
other public interest. 55

54
E.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (interpreting Section 109 of the Clean Air Act
to exclude consideration of economic cost in setting national ambient air quality standards).
55
There is also a strain of administrative law theory, the unitary executive, which would allow a President direct
decision-making authority over every action of the administrative state. See, e.g., FUNK, SHAPIRO, & WEAVER,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 609-612 (6th ed. 2018).
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Early on in the era of expanding regulatory activity, the Office of the President began
imposing procedural requirements on agencies to ensure consideration of the economic impact of
regulations. In 1974, President Ford issued an Executive Order requiring each agency to prepare
“Inflation Impact Statements” for “major . . . regulations[] and rules . . . which may have a
significant impact on inflation” and tasked the Office of Management and Budget with the
responsibility of developing criteria for undertaking economic analyses. 56 The name was
changed in 1976 to “Economic Impact Statements.” 57
Less than two years later, President Carter established a systematic process for the
executive branch to review both existing and newly proposed regulations. 58 President Carter’s
Executive Order articulated a policy of “achiev[ing] legislative goals effectively and efficiently,”
with regulations that do not “impose unnecessary burdens on the economy, on individuals, on
public or private organizations, or on State and local governments.” 59 This policy included the
establishment of a government-wide regulatory agenda and agency-specific processes for
classifying “significant” regulations that warrant further analysis. 60 For major rules, regulatory
analysis required a “a succinct statement of the problem; description of the major alternative
ways of dealing with the problem that were considered by the agency; an analysis of the
economic consequences of each of these alternatives and a detailed explanation of the reasons for
choosing one alternative over the others.” 61

Exec. Order 11,821 (Nov. 27, 1974). The Order also directed the preparation of inflation impact statements for
proposals of major legislation—similar in language to the requirement provided in the National Environmental
Policy Act. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
57
Exec. Order 11,949 (Dec. 31, 1976).
58
Exec. Order 12,044 (Mar. 23, 1978).
59
Id. § 1.
60
Id. § 2.
61
Id. § 3.
56
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1. Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Reagan Executive Order
Executive Order 12,291 marked a turning point in presidential control of the executive
branch’s regulatory agenda. 62 The Order formalized some of the policies from President
Reagan’s predecessors and added specific procedural requirements for review of major
regulatory actions prior to publication. While earlier Executive Orders had set up the Office of
Management and Budget to receive information from individual agencies and oversee their
preparation of regulatory impact analysis, Executive Order 12,291 gave the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a division within the White House’s Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), direct authority to review the content of executive agency rules
and regulatory analyses and explicitly allowed the OMB Director to block rules until this review
was completed. 63
President Reagan’s order defined a “major rule” as a regulation likely to have “an annual
effect on the economy of $100 million or more” or other major economic impacts. 64 The OMB
was directed to provide criteria for agencies to use in determining whether each proposal or rule
under consideration was “major.” 65 The Order required each executive agency to prepare, for
each major rule, a Regulatory Impact Analysis, including a description of the rule’s potential

Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
Id. § 3(f)(1) (“Upon the request of the [OMB] Director, an agency shall . . . refrain from publishing its preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis or notice of proposed rulemaking until [review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis] is
concluded.”)
64
Id. § 1(b)
65
Id. § 3(b).
62
63
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benefits, costs, and net benefits (including effects “that cannot be quantified in monetary terms"),
as well as alternative approaches that could potentially reduce regulatory costs. 66
Reagan’s order was part of an overall strategy to both centralize and politicize executive
branch authority by shifting decision-making authority to the White House and by appointing
officials across various departments and agencies that took aggressive postures in reshaping
regulatory priorities over the objections of bureaucratic staff. 67 Requiring cost-benefit analysis
induced procedural change at the agency level, slowing down the rulemaking process—a feature,
rather than a bug, of the order—and gave the OMB the ability to stop or put pressure on agencies
to change rules with which the White House had substantive disagreements. 68
Throughout the 1980s, under the Reagan and first Bush Administrations, criticism of
cost-benefit analysis centered on the imbalance that analysis caused by disproportionately
focusing on costs. 69 Regulatory costs in the areas of environmental protection, health, and safety
tend to be more highly concentrated on regulated industries with obligations to change practices,
install pollution control equipment, or adopt safety procedures. Review in the OMB gave
regulated parties “an additional mechanism for . . . back-channel participation, which reinforced
the review system’s antiregulatory inclinations.” 70 Benefits, enjoyed by the public at large, tend
to be more widespread and diffuse, more difficult to quantify. As a result, the White House had
gained a quantitative cudgel to use in opposing regulation, with no mechanism for after-the-fact
review as to whether those cost or benefit estimates were accurate.

Id. § 3(a), (d).
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2277 (2001).
68
See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 18-19 (1991) (cited in Kagan, supra note 66, at 2277).
69
See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 67; FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005).
70
Kagan, supra note 69, at 2280.
66
67
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2. Cost-Benefit Analysis from Clinton to Biden
In 1993, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,866, which adopted many of the
same elements of cost-benefit analysis and centralized OMB review of agency regulation that
had been put in place by the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations. 71 The first section
in the Executive Order directed executive agencies to “assess both the costs and the benefits of
the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify,
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.” 72
Despite criticism from liberal constituencies within the Democratic Party that had
objected to the continuation of this type of regulatory review, cost-benefit analysis and the role
of the OMB became more consolidated in the 1990s. President Clinton exerted centralized
control over the Administration’s regulatory agenda to a greater extent than had been seen
before, but with some important changes to the process that facilitated some greater degree of
transparency and public participation in the OMB/OIRA review process, as well as a nod to the
importance of qualitative measures and distributive impacts of regulation. 73

Exec. Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
Id. § 1(b)(6) (emphasis added). The policy that benefits ought to justify the costs was a subtle, but intentional shift
from the Reagan-era requirement that the benefits outweigh the costs, allowing in theory, if not in practice, the idea
that non-quantifiable benefits might take a more prominent role in the process. See Amy Sinden, Executive Order
12866’s Cost-Benefit Test is Still With Us And I Can Hear Ben Franklin Rolling Over in His Grave, CPRBlog, Oct.
2, 2013, http://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/executive-order-12866-s-cost-benefit-test-is-still-with-us-and-i-canhear-ben-franklin-rolling-over-in-his-grave/.
73
See Kagan, supra note 69, at 2285-2290 (describing the differences between Executive Order 12,866 and its
predecessors)
71
72

19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4185062

Under the George W. Bush Administration, 74 the OMB finalized guidance on the
preparation of regulatory impact analysis in OMB Circular A-4. 75 The document built on “best
practices” that the Clinton OMB had established in 1996, and has continued to guide the process
since. 76 Circular A-4 calls for “an examination of alternative approaches” and “an evaluation of
the benefits and costs—quantitative and qualitative—of the proposed action and the main
alternatives identified by the analysis.” 77 It includes guidance for agencies to apply economic
concepts throughout the process (e.g., opportunity costs or regulation, the use of “willingness to
pay” estimates as a measurement of costs and benefits, and guidelines for applying discount rates
for future costs and benefits). 78 It is important to note here that individual agencies maintain their
own policies and procedures for conducting regulatory impact analysis, in line with Executive
Orders and informed by Circular A-4. 79
President Barack Obama carried forward the essential elements of the cost-benefit
analysis of his predecessors, issuing his own Executive Order in 2011. 80 Executive Order 13,563
describes itself as “supplemental” to Clinton’s order, “reaffirm[ing] the principles, structures,
and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review.” 81 The Obama Administration’s
ratcheted-up focus on cost-benefit analysis led to high-profile clashes in Obama’s first term

74
President George W. Bush added an additional gloss on cost-benefit analysis by requiring each agency to
“identify in writing the specific market failure . . . or other specific problem that it intends to address” in justifying
significant new rules; however, this requirement was eliminated by President Obama. Exec. Order 13,422 (Jan. 18,
2007), revoked by Exec. Order 13,497 (Jan. 30, 2009).
75
OMB Circular A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf.
76
See id.
77
Id. at 2.
78
Id. at 18-37,
79
Given that the case study in this Article is centered on the Clean Water Act, the EPA’s guidelines are of particular
significance. U.S. EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2014), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2017-08/documents/ee-0568-50.pdf.
80
Exec. Order 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
81
Id. at § 1(b).
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between the OIRA Administrator, Cass Sunstein, and agency officials at the EPA, such as firstterm EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson. 82 In one example, OIRA specifically directed the EPA to
withdraw a proposed revision of the national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for groundlevel ozone before it was finalized. 83
President Trump’s tenure marked a sharp departure from the bipartisan development of
cost-benefit analysis. In January 2017, President Trump signed his own Executive Order 84 that
defined his Administration’s approach to the regulatory process: rejecting rationality in costbenefit analysis in favor of an exclusive focus on regulatory costs. The “one in, two out” order,
as it came to be known, required each agency, upon the proposal of any new administrative
rulemaking, to identify two regulations for elimination. 85 The Executive Order further imposed a
“regulatory cap,” prohibiting each agency from promulgating any new regulation with any
“incremental cost” unless fully offset by the repeal of existing regulations. 86 On its face this
executive order was problematic, as it would seem to interfere with statutory requirements of
executive branch agencies. 87 But it also undercut the concept of economic efficiency that had
guided the executive branch for over 40 years.

Lisa Heinzerling, Associate Administrator of Policy at the EPA in 2009, has been a prominent critic of Sunstein’s
tenure at OIRA. See ,e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark: The Department of Justice’s Economic
Analysis of Prison Rape, CPRBlog, June 14, 2012 (describing the application of “willingness to pay” economic
analysis in a regulation setting standards for preventing and responding to rape and sexual assault in prisons).
83
Letter from OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson on Ozone National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, Sept. 2, 2011, available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf.
84
Exec. Order 13,771, 82 FED. REG. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
85
Id. sec. 2(a) (“Unless prohibited by law, whenever an executive department or agency (agency) publicly proposes
for notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall identify at least two existing regulations
to be repealed.”)
86
Id. sec. 2(b)-(c) (directing agencies that “the total incremental cost of all new regulations, including repealed
regulations, to be finalized this year shall be no greater than zero, unless otherwise required by law or consistent
with advice provided in writing by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget”).
87
Section 2 of the Order qualified these requirements with caveats such as “unless otherwise required by law” and
“to the extent permitted by law” and directed agencies to follow the APA in rule repeals. Id. sec. 2(a)-(c). However,
requiring agencies to use new regulations as a trigger to force rule rescission creates a contradiction with the
82
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As an indicator of the one-sidedness of the policy, the words “cost” or “costs” appeared
18 times in President Trump’s Executive Order (including the title), while “benefit” appeared
only once—in the disclaimer at the end that the order “is not intended to, and does not, create
any right or benefit.” 88 The order contained a multitude of exceptions, and a study conducted 18
months after its signing revealed that few, if any, new agency rules had actually been subject to
the requirement. 89
President Biden, on the day of his inauguration in 2021, issued a Memorandum on
“Modernizing Regulatory Review” that laid out the new Administration’s approach to regulatory
review, “reaffirm[ing] the basic principles” of Clinton and Obama’s orders. 90 Importantly, the
memorandum directed OMB to revise Circular A-4, 91 and scholars and commentators have
weighed in with a variety of different perspectives on how Biden’s appointees may conduct such
a review and implement any potential changes. 92

3. Four Decades of Criticism

reasoned decision-making required by the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard by introducing external factors in
the decision-making process that Congress did not intend to include.
88
Id. sec. 5©.
89
See Connor Raso, How has Trump’s Deregulatory Order Worked in Practice?, Brookings, Sept. 6, 2018,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-has-trumps-deregulatory-order-worked-in-practice/. For an earlier
quantitative study of this question from 2017, see Roncevert Ganan Almond, Measuring President Trump’s
Regulatory Reform Agenda: The 2-for-1 Rule, Yale Journal on Regulation Notice & Comment, Nov. 22, 2017,
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/measuring-president-trumps-regulatory-reform-agenda-the-2-for-1-rule-by-roncevertganan-almond/. In 2019, the Department of Transportation included the “2-for-1” requirement in its Administrative
Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures, but this policy was reversed in March 2021. See U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., Repeal of Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/repeal-administrative-rulemaking-guidance-and-enforcementprocedures.
90
Presidential Memorandum, Modernizing Regulatory Review, 86 Fed. Reg. 7223 (Jan. 26, 2021).
91
Id. at § 2(b).
92
The Penn Program on Regulation published a series of six essays analyzing the memorandum in February 2021.
Regulatory Review Reimagined, The Regulatory Review, Feb. 15, 2021,
https://www.theregreview.org/2021/02/15/regulatory-review-reimagined/.
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In forty-plus years of executive branch experience with regulatory impact analysis,
several lines of criticism merit discussion, both from the right and from the left. On one hand,
conservative policymakers and judges have looked with increasing skepticism at agencies’ use of
“co-benefits” (additional benefits that flow directly from the regulation but are not tied to the
statutory justification for the regulation). The criticism is rooted in a normative preference
against regulation and an expectation that cost-benefit analysis and OMB review ought to slow
down or stop costly regulation. 93 Indeed, the practical effect of OMB review during the Reagan
Administration and subsequent Republican presidencies was to give industry advocates and
critics of agency regulation in government an opportunity to use cost-benefit analysis as a
gatekeeper, utilizing the language of economics. 94 Yet as regulatory impact analysis matured in
the Clinton Administration, scientific studies repeatedly vindicated the rationality of
environmental, health, and safety regulations, showing that the benefits to society regularly
outmatched estimated costs, sometimes by an order of magnitude or more. 95
In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court grappled with the use of co-benefits in justifying
the regulation of mercury and toxic air emissions from power plants. 96 The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 called on the EPA to regulate a host of toxic and hazardous air pollutants,
but specifically required that the EPA undertake a study of pollutants from the power sector and,
prior to regulating that sector in particular, make a finding as to whether such regulation is

See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 69, at 42 (connecting cost-benefit analysis requirements at the OMB to
earlier studies by economists in the 1970s).
94
See id.
95
For example, the EPA’s report in 2011, which looked at the results from the Clean Air Act from 1990 to that point
and projected until 2020, concluded that the benefits from clean air—better health, avoided mortality, and improved
productivity—“exceed[ed] costs by a factor of more than 30 to one,” with estimated benefits of $2 trillion compare
to $65 billion in costs. U.S. EPA, Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990-2020, the Second Prospective Study
(2011), available at https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-1990-2020second-prospective-study.
96
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015).
93
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“appropriate and necessary.” 97 After long delays from several administrations, the Obama
Administration finalized a rule under this section that limited mercury and toxic emissions from
fossil-fuel-fired power plants (commonly referred to as the “MATS” rule). 98 The Supreme Court
struck down the rule in a 5-4 decision, on the grounds that the EPA had not considered the cost
of the regulation at the initial stage of determining whether regulation was “appropriate and
necessary.” 99 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion expressed skepticism regarding the agency’s
reliance on quantifying co-benefits of the regulatory program to justify the anticipated high
compliance costs. 100 After the Obama-era EPA reaffirmed the MATS rule in 2016 (this time,
considering costs), the Trump Administration reversed the “appropriate and necessary” finding
in 2020, revising and rejecting the EPA’s prior approach to cost-benefit analysis. 101 The 2020
finding sharply criticized reliance on co-benefits to justify regulation, explicitly stating that the
agency did not view all benefits to be equal. 102
This marked a rejection of a strictly economic or efficiency-based approach to regulatory
impact analysis, favoring policy goals of restricting agency authority over a maximization of
social welfare in the regulatory process. In other words, the Trump EPA’s conservative criticism
of the analysis process became an argument that the tools, if employed by a pro-regulatory
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (2012). The study and original “appropriate and necessary” finding had been concluded in
2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (2000).
99
Michigan, 576 U.S. at 760.
100
Id. at 749-50. In this case, the EPA found that it could not quantify much of the direct benefits from limiting
mercury emissions; however, the EPA estimated $37-90 billion per year in co-benefits from the rule, largely due to
the significant public health benefits from a reduction in particulate matter (PM) emitted by coal-fired power plants
when hazardous air pollutants are regulated (even though PM is not itself a pollutant targeted by the regulation). Id.;
see 77 Fed. Reg. 9306 Table 2 (summarizing the monetized benefits and costs, including co-benefits).
101
U.S. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units—Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 85 Fed.
Reg. 31,286 (2020). The EPA’s website chronicles the various back-and-forth stages of the rule, before and after the
Michigan v. EPA decision. U.S. EPA, Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sourcesair-pollution/mercury-and-air-toxics-standards (accessed Feb. 3, 2022).
102
U.S. EPA, supra note 101, 85 Fed. Reg. at 31,299 (“In these circumstances, to give equal weight to the
monetized PM2.5 co-benefits would permit those benefits to become the driver of the regulatory determination[.]”).
97
98
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administration, are too malleable. 103 Congress’ failure to update statutes in the past several
decades means that the old statutes are going to be used to address not only old problems but also
new ones. 104 Thus, whether we should expect and encourage agencies to use old statutes to craft
flexible regulation with co-benefits as a response to a stalled Congress has become part of the
overall battle as to the legitimacy of administrative action in the present era. 105 This also has the
effect of downplaying the significance of economics and science in supporting administrative
decisions.
On the other hand, advocates of regulation remain skeptical of cost-benefit analysis as a
regulatory tool because it does not adequately reflect those benefits that cannot be easily
quantified. 106 Further, the Executive Orders since the 1980s, as well as OMB Circular A-4, look
to the aggregate costs and benefits of agency decision-making for society as a whole, which can
obscure the burdens and benefits of policymaking for different populations across geographic
differences, economic class, race, gender, and other categories. 107 Aggregation without attention
to the distributive impacts of regulation leads inevitably to disproportionate socioeconomic
impacts. An Executive Order on Environmental Justice promulgated by President Clinton

The Trump EPA’s resistance to letting co-benefits “become the driver” of the regulatory process is a transparent
expression of skepticism about whether the entire cost-benefit analysis process legitimizes agency action. See id.
104
See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
105
This is the core of the Supreme Court’s recent push to revive the non-delegation doctrine and strengthen the
major questions doctrine, rejecting any agency action based on existing statutory authority that might seem
“surprising” or novel. See Lisa Heinzerling, Perspective: Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 386 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 2255 (June 16, 2022), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2201800 (noting, for example, that
“during oral arguments in West Virginia v. EPA, Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that a judge applying the
major questions idea to an agency decision should ask whether it is “surprising” that the agency made that
decision”).
106
See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Executive Order 12866’s Cost-Benefit Test is Still With Us and I Can Hear Ben Franklin
Rolling Over in His Grave, CPRBlog, Oct. 2, 2013, http://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/executive-order-12866-scost-benefit-test-is-still-with-us-and-i-can-hear-ben-franklin-rolling-over-in-his-grave/ (arguing that President
Obama’s policy for regulatory impact analysis paid “lip-service to the difficulties of quantification” but continued a
longer-term trend of focusing on costs and benefits that are easily monetized).
107
See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro, Regulatory Analysis Needs to Catch Up on Distribution, The Reg Review, Feb. 15,
2021, https://www.theregreview.org/2021/02/15/shapiro-regulatory-analysis-needs-distribution/.
103
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ostensibly addresses this issue for minority and low income populations, 108 but with limited
impact; President Biden’s Memorandum in January 2021 calls particular attention to this issue in
asking for review of the regulatory process. 109 The extent to which policy on this point will
change in practice remains to be seen. 110

C. Regulation in an Era of Complexity
The rise of this Cost-Benefit Analysis means that every “significant” informal
rulemaking will include the agency’s supporting data and analysis of economic impacts and
benefits, along with any other data required by statutes’ substantive requirements (such as
jeopardy determinations under the Endangered Species Act 111). Regulatory impact analysis
becomes part of a rulemaking framework that administrative law scholars will recognize from
the Federal Register: legal authority, comments and other evidence, and agency responses to
these comments and data. 112
With this legal scaffolding, legal challenges to agency action based on the APA’s
standard of review have followed a set pattern – claims that (a) statutes don’t provide legal
authority or are incorrectly interpreted (“contrary to law”), and/or (b) not all data and comments
are appropriately considered (“arbitrary and capricious”). 113 One key advantage for challengers

Exec. Order 12,898 (1994).
Presidential Memorandum, Modernizing Regulatory Review, 86 Fed. Reg. 7223 (Jan. 26, 2021).
110
See Regulatory Review Reimagined, supra note 92.
111
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b).
112
The APA requires agencies to include a “concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose” along with
the publication of a final rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Final rules are published in the Federal Register, but agencies may
also refer to technical appendices and other documents that are part of the official decision-making record.
113
Victor Flatt, Rob Verchick, Michael O’Hear, and Mark Squillace, Let the People Speak: Notice and Comment
Rulemaking (Lessons from the Controversial New Source Review Proposal of the Clean Air Act), 34 Envt’l. L. Rep.
10115 (2004).
108
109
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in this process is that cost-benefit analysis, scientific data, and other information collected by
agencies is available to provide a window into the agencies’ decision-making, with potential
insight into the assumptions and calculations upon which regulations are based.
However, raw data (whether economic or scientific) may not make it into the official
Federal Register notice, but instead may be buried in appendices and technical supplements—
less visible, yet part of the full record of agency decision-making that can be considered in
judicial review. Legal challenges typically only cover the information that is front and center in
the Federal Register notices, based on the agency’s stated reasoning and information mandated
by applicable statutory requirements. 114
Using the Navigable Waters Protection Rule (NWPR), we can see that this limited
approach—looking at the surface of agencies’ scientific data and regulatory impact analysis—is
deficient. By working together with economic or scientific experts to look “under the hood,”
administrative lawyers and regulatory advocates can provide better oversight of the rulemaking
process, ensuring that agencies’ decisions are rooted in reasonable assumptions and rational
application of the evidence before them. This also suggests changes to how such information is
presented in rulemaking.

III.

CASE STUDY – THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND THE NAVIGABLE WATERS
PROTECTION RULE (“NWPR”)

114
Examples of decisions including more specific scientific data in the Federal Register publications include
Endangered Species Act listing determinations. See, e.g., the National Marine Fisheries Service’s proposed listing of
the Chambered Nautilus as threatened under the Endangered Species Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,948 (2017), available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document/NOAA-NMFS-2016-0098-0029.
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A recent series of rulemakings defining the jurisdiction of Waters of the United States
(“WOTUS”) in the Trump Administration provides an important case study in the importance of
underlying scientific and economic data in Section 553 rulemaking processes.
A. History of “Waters of the United States”
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act, 115 with the goal of restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 116 The
statute requires a permit in order to discharge any “pollutant” 117 into “navigable waters,” which
the Act further defines as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 118
Which “waters” Congress intended to include under the term “Waters of the United States” in
the Clean Water Act has been the subject of disagreements, administrative actions, and court
cases for decades. As stated by Justice Sotomayor:
“In decades past, the EPA and the Corps (collectively, the agencies) have struggled to
define and apply that statutory term. And this Court, in turn, has considered those
regulatory efforts on several occasions . . .” 119
The statute does not itself define WOTUS further, and the definition of the term was left
to regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Army Corps of

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, as amended, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
117
The term is defined broadly in the statute to include “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or
discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”
Id. § 1562(6).
118
Id. § 1562(7).
119
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) v. Department of Defense, 538 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 617, 625
(2018) (citations omitted).
115
116
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Engineers (“Army Corps”), both of whom have jurisdiction over parts of the Clean Water Act. 120
For purposes of CWA jurisdiction, the EPA and the US Army Corps are collectively referred to
as “the Agencies.” 121
The Army Corps initially construed WOTUS as being limited to the prior jurisdictional
reach of navigable waters, but this was successfully challenged in Resources Defense Council v.
Calloway. 122
“Congress by defining the term “navigable waters”…to mean “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas,” asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters
to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Accordingly, as used in the Water Act, the term is not limited to the traditional test of
navigability.” 123
Army Corps and EPA administrative actions addressing WOTUS jurisdiction occurred in
1977, 1980, 1982, 1986, and 1988. 124 The most consequential administrative action occurred in
1982, when the EPA and the Army Corps adopted what became known as the joint definition of
WOTUS:
“(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are
subject to the ebb and flow of tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate “wetlands”;

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (delegating authority to both the EPA Administrator and the Army Corps, through the
Secretary of the Army).
121
Dep’t of the Army, Corps of Eng’rs & E.P.A., Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 86 Fed. Reg.
69,372, 69,372 (2021).
122
392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
123
Id.
124
42 Fed. Reg. 37,144 (July 19, 1977); 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336 (Dec. 24, 1980); 47 Fed. Reg/ 31,794 (July 22, 1982);
51 Fed. Reg. 41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986); 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764 (June 6, 1988).
120
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(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, “wetlands,” playa lakes, or natural ponds the use,
degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters: (1) Which are or could be used by interstate or
foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; (2) From which fish or shellfish are
or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (3) Which are used or
could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States
under this definition;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (1)-(4) of this definition;
(f) The territorial seas; and
(g) “Wetlands” adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)-(f) of this definition. 125”

Challenges to the scope of the statutory and regulatory definitions have come before the
United States Supreme Court in the last four decades, culminating in cases that questioned the
validity of the Army Corps and the EPA’s administrative determinations over what constituted
WOTUS. In the first case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court upheld the
Corps’ application of the statute to wetlands “adjacent” to “rivers, streams, and other
hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters,’” without drawing any
particular line as to how far this interpretation could go. 126 In 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (“SWANCC”) 127 a majority of the Court
placed limits on the concept, holding that for reasons related to constitutional interpretation, that
Congress could not have intended the term “Waters of the United States” to cover all wetlands

See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1981) (EPA’s definition); Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,810 (codified in 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1983)) (Corps’ definition).
126
474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
127
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
125
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that were migratory bird habitat. 128 The most recent Supreme Court case concerning WOTUS
jurisdiction, Rapanos v. United States, 129 also overturned a jurisdictional determination by the
Army Corps. Rapanos was a fractured decision, whose holding was itself in dispute for a time. 130
The Rapanos plurality opinion limited the “waters of the United States” to:
“only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water
‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . .
oceans, rivers, and lakes.’” 131
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the plurality’s test and
instead focused on whether or not a “water” has a “significant nexus” with a navigable water. 132
Based on the Kennedy concurrence, the EPA and the Army Corps issued guidance in late 2008
asserting that the “significant nexus” standard would be the “controlling” standard to make
jurisdictional determinations. 133 This in turn meant that some jurisdictional determinations were
to be made on a case by case basis. 134
In response to the confusion created by the split opinion in Rapanos, the Obama
Administration sought to finalize an updated regulatory definition through Section 553 notice
and comment rulemaking. In June 2015, the EPA and the Army Corps published the final Clean

Id. at 162.
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
130
See, e.g., Precon Dev. Corp., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288–89
(4th Cir. 2011) (stating that Kennedy test “undisputedly controls” and reserving question of
whether jurisdiction may be established under plurality’s standard as well).
131
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739.
132
Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States &
Carabell v. United States (Dec, 2, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201602/documents/cwa_jurisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf
134
Id. at 4. The Obama Administration’s 2015 definition of WOTUS called for a “case-specific” decision on
“significant nexus” waters. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(8) (2015).
128
129
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Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States (“CWR Rule”). 135 Asserting that it was
enshrining the “significant nexus” standard, the rulemaking attempted to standardize the
characteristics of water bodies that would be subject to a variety of CWA regulations, with a
particular focus on those waters subject to the case-by-case analysis that had previously given
rise to the litigation over these issues, including small headwaters, “isolated” wetlands, and
ephemeral and intermittent streams. 136
The Clean Water Rule was challenged immediately in multiple courts, initially with
disagreement over whether original jurisdiction lay in the Federal Courts of Appeals or the
Federal District Courts. 137 This issue was ultimately resolved in favor of the district courts. 138
The rule was then stayed in many states, which reverted the jurisdictional standard to the
previous 2008 guidance. 139
B. Navigable Waters Protection Rule
By Executive Order 13778 in February 2017, the Trump Administration announced a
planned repeal of the stayed 2015 CWR rule. 140 Subsequent to the Executive Order, the EPA and
the Army Corps published an “Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water
Rule.” 141 The agencies issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in July 2017, 142
followed by a supplemental notice seeking additional comment in July 2018. 143

The Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).
Id. at 37,057.
137
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 617, 634 (2018).
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018); Texas v. EPA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 497 (S.D. Tex.
2019).
140
Exec. Order 13,778, § 2 (2017).
141
82 Fed. Reg. 12,532 (March 6, 2017).
142
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017).
143
83 Fed. Reg. 32,227 (July 12, 2018).
135
136
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The EPA and the Army Corps then issued a proposed rulemaking to replace the CWR
rule with one significantly altering jurisdictional determination for WOTUS. This rule was
finalized as the Navigable Waters Protection Rule (“NWPR”) in April 2020, with an effective
date of June 20, 2020. 144145 The NWPR established a significantly narrower definition of
WOTUS, based on President Trump’s direction that the agencies consider Justice Scalia’s
opinion from Rapanos. 146 The definition accomplishes this by limiting the scope of what is
considered an “adjacent wetland,” rejecting the Obama-era definition’s inclusion of wetlands
with a “significant nexus” to other jurisdictional waters. 147
Several legal challenges were filed against the NWPR, 148 but the rule went into effect
nationally while those cases were pending. 149 One of the challenges succeeded in overturning
the rule in 2021. 150 The Biden Administration has indicated an intent to again define WOTUS
administratively, and the Supreme Court has also accepted an appeal on the issue for its 2021-22
term. 151
C.

The Legal Challenges to NWPR

85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (April 21, 2020).
In addition to the two-step repeal and replace plan, the Trump Administration engaged in a third rulemaking
process designed to suspend the Clean Water Rule until February 2020. While the Clean Water Rule stated that it
was effective as of August 28, 2015, EPA and the Corps published a separate final rule (Applicability Date Rule),
which added a new “applicability date” of February 6, 2020, to the Clean Water Rule. 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200, (Feb. 6,
2018).
146
NWPR, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,259; Exec. Order 13,778, § 3 (2017).
147
Compare NWPR, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,258 (describing the “significant nexus” portion of the 2015 Rule) with 33
CFR 328.3(c)(1) (2020) (Trump NWPR definition).
148
See e.g. State of California et al. v. U.S. EPA, Case 3:20-cv-03005-RS (N.D. Cal. 2020).
149
Colorado v. US EPA, Appellate Case: 20-1238 Document: 010110487459 (10th Cir. 2021).
150
See Pasquq Yaqui Tribe, supra note 3.
151
Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (Dec. 7, 2021); Amy Howe, Justices
Take up Cases on Power of District Courts and Regulation of Wetlands, SCOTUSblog, Jan. 24, 2022,
https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/01/justices-take-up-cases-on-power-of-district-courts-and-regulation-of-wetlands/
(referring to the Court’s grant of certiorari in Sackett v. EPA).
144
145
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The legal challenges to the Trump NWPR focused on both whether the rulemaking is
consistent with statutory requirements of the Clean Water Act, 152 and on administrative
procedure, arguing that the Trump administration failed to follow appropriate procedure and that
the repeal and replacement was “arbitrary and capricious.” 153 As noted above, “arbitrary and
capricious” may cover many potential administrative failures, including the failure to find and/or
consider evidence or comments, relying on impermissible reasons for undergoing an
administrative action, and making a decision that “runs counter to the evidence before the
agency.” 154
In the initial three legal complaints filed challenging the Trump NWPR Rule there are
numerous overlapping claims alleging that the rulemaking is arbitrary and capricious. 155 These
claims fit into three broad categories. First, the plaintiffs argued that the rulemaking is arbitrary
and capricious because it is “contrary to the entirety of the record.” 156 For instance, the
Conservation Law Foundation claimed that “the Agencies do not give a reasoned explanation for
disregarding findings and undisputed facts that underlay a prior policy.” 157 Relatedly, the
complaints note that the Agencies did not explain the change in their position, which conflicts

See paragraph 16, Conservation Law Foundation et al. v. EPA complaint, filed April 29, 2020, Case No. 20-cv10820; See paragraph 4, Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. EPA complaint, filed ______, Case no. _______, available
at
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2020/04/29/document_gw_07.pdf;
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2020/06/22/document_gw_04.pdf.
153
See e.g. paragraph 14, Conservation Law Foundation et al. v. EPA complaint, filed April 29, 2020, Case No. 20cv-10820; See paragraph 5, Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. EPA complaint, filed ______, Case no. _______; See
South Carolina Coastal Commission et al. v. Wheeler, complaint, filed ______, Case no. _______.
154
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). See supra Part II.A.
155
The first three filed complaints were: Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22,
2020); Conservation Law Found. v. E.P.A., No. 20-cv-10820 (D. Mass. April 29, 2020); and S.C. Coastal
Conservation League, No. 2:20-cv-01687-DCN (D.S.C. April 29, 2020).
156
Complaint at 24, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020).
152

157

Complaint at 46, Conservation Law Found. v. E.P.A., No. 20-cv-10820 (D. Mass. April 29, 2020).
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with record evidence. 158 As specified in the Puget Soundkeepers complaint, the rulemaking
“reverses findings the Agencies made” in prior rules. 159
A second major arbitrary and capricious category in these first complaints concerns
ignoring expert opinion. The Agencies allegedly failed to consider the Science Report, the
comments of the Science Advisory Board, or scientific issues raised by the general public, all of
which allegedly supported a broader and more scientifically rooted definition than that offered
by the Navigable Waters Protection Rule. 160 “The Navigable Waters Rule is contrary to the
Agencies’ own scientific analysis, and the Agencies did not offer a rational explanation for this
contradiction.” 161
As stated in the Puget Soundkeeper complaint: “the Agencies failed to assess, consider
and explain the effects on the physical, chemical, or biological integrity of the Nation’s waters or
the extent to which waters will lose Clean Water Act protections.” 162 As a more specific
example, according to both the Puget Soundkeeper and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation
League the rulemaking is arbitrary and capricious because it bases the rule on the “typical year”
test, which examines the permanence of surface flow without considering the effects climate
change would have on said surface flow. 163

Complaint at 24, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020); Complaint at
64, S.C. Coastal Conservation League, No. 2:20-cv-01687-DCN (D.S.C. April 29, 2020).
158

Complaint at 24, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020).
Complaint at 24, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020); Complaint at
47, Conservation Law Found. v. E.P.A., No. 20-cv-10820 (D. Mass. April 29, 2020); Complaint at 65, S.C. Coastal
Conservation League, No. 2:20-cv-01687-DCN (D.S.C. April 29, 2020).
161
Complaint at 24, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020).
162
Complaint at 25, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020).
163
Complaint at 25, Puget Soundkeeper All. v. E.P.A., No. 2:20-cv-950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020); Complaint at
68, S.C. Coastal Conservation League, No. 2:20-cv-01687-DCN (D.S.C. April 29, 2020).
159
160
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These three complaints to the Trump NWPR demonstrate that it is unusual for a legal
challenge to go “under the hood,” to argue an agency action was arbitrary and capricious because
of the robustness of the underlying economic or scientific studies. The South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League’s complaint does mention the Agencies possible mischaracterization of
state laws, arguing that states:
do not have comparable programs; cannot adopt laws more stringent than federal
standards; do not have adequate staffing to implement more robust programs; and failed
in every vital aspect to protect national water quality when…states were in charge of
regulating water pollution. 164
But even this complaint doesn’t quantify or specify these state errors. Thus, while the
legal challenges to the NWPR argue a traditional arbitrary and capricious flaw from the face of
the rulemaking, it turns out a deep dive into the record examining the underlying data yields
some very strong arguments, revealing additional “legal” concerns that could otherwise go
unexamined.
D.

The Economic Analyses Supporting the Inter-related Rulemakings

Four economic analyses (EAs) are associated with the NWPR rulemaking process – one
each for the 2015 final rule, 165 the 2017 repeal proposal, 166 the 2017 repeal final rule 167 and the

Complaint at 67, S.C. Coastal Conservation League, No. 2:20-cv-01687-DCN (D.S.C. April 29, 2020).
US EPA & Army Corps of Eng’rs, Economic Analysis of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule (May 20, 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-06/documents/508-final_clean_water_rule_economic_analysis_5-2015.pdf.
166
US EPA & Army Corps of Eng’rs, Economic Analysis for the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United
States” – Recodification of Pre-existing Rules (June 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201706/documents/economic_analysis_proposed_step1_rule.pdf.
167
US EPA & Army Corps of Eng’rs, Economic Analysis for the Final Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United
States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201909/documents/wotus_rin-2040-af74_final_ea_508compliant_20190905.pdf.
164
165
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2019 replacement proposed rule. 168 Estimated benefits and costs of these rules (or foregone
benefits and costs in the case of repeal) vary widely, especially on the benefits side.
Importantly, these economic analyses generally concluded that the rule change would
create a “net positive” benefit, even though federal jurisdiction will be lost. This is primarily
related to two key assumptions: that many states would take up regulation of newly nonjurisdictional waters (meaning that, in the agencies’ analysis, there would be no change in water
quality and therefore no change in associated benefits), and that such state jurisdiction is
inherently better at regulating “local goods” than federal jurisdiction. 169
According to a report prepared by a team of economists and law professors (including
one of this article’s authors) for the External Environmental Economics Advisory Council, both
of these assumptions are flawed. In pertinent part, the E-EEAC report notes that:
The EAs for the Clean Water Rule repeal and its replacement, the Navigable Waters
Protection Rule, both assert that “…states may be in a better position than the federal
government to regulate local environmental public goods (e.g., water quality),” but the
best available research in science and economics contradicts this statement. . . .The
science suggests that the affected waters are connected to downstream waters, and many

168
US EPA & Army Corps of Eng’rs, Economic Analysis for the Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of
“Waters of the United States” (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/202001/documents/econ_analysis_-_nwpr.pdf. As noted above, the 2017 repeal proposal was never finalized via
publication in the Federal Register. In the meantime, the Trump Administration in February 2018 set a two-year
delay for the original 2015 rule, which would have made it applicable in February 2020, presumably buying time to
develop its new proposal. This delay was also litigated, and federal courts determined that the EPA and the Corps
had violated the Administrative Procedure Act in the delay proposal. Until the 2019 final rule was published in the
Federal Register, the 2015 WOTUS rule was stayed in some states, and remained in place in others. See supra notes
130-141 and accompanying text.
169
Keiser, Olmstead, Boyle, Flatt, Keeler, Phaneuf, Shapiro, & Shimshack, Report on the Repeal of the Clean
Water Rule and its Replacement with the Navigable Waters Protection Rule to Define Waters of the United States
(WOTUS) 5, prepared by the External Environmental Economics Advisory Panel (E-EEAC) (December 2020),
available at https://cb4388c0-f641-4b7b-a3ad281c0e6f8e88.filesusr.com/ugd/669644_5aa4f5f0493a4902a3aaed117bd92aef.pdf.
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state borders are arbitrary with respect to hydrological features such as watershed
boundaries (for example, the three case-study watersheds analyzed in the EAs all cross
multiple state lines). Under these conditions, the narrowing of CWA jurisdiction will
likely result in transboundary pollution. The basic theory of efficient regulatory
decentralization assumes that there is no transboundary pollution, and the empirical
literature in economics suggests that in the presence of such externalities, water quality
is likely to decrease. 170
In addition, the probability of the states taking up federal jurisdiction was also found to
be problematic based on past behavior. As noted by the E-EEAC:
The prediction that dozens of states will assume jurisdiction over the waters newly
removed from federal CWA jurisdiction is inconsistent with states’ prior behavior, as
well as EPA’s Guidelines. For example, in 2001, a Supreme Court decision removed
federal protection from a large share of U.S. wetlands when it overturned the Migratory
Bird Rule; in response, only a few states moved to expand their own jurisdiction over
some of the affected waters over the following two decades. 171
Of particular interest to legal analysts, the economic analyses based the assumption of
state regulation as a substitute for federal jurisdiction on legal interpretations of specific state
statutes and regulations—namely, state laws concerning whether or not a state may adopt more
stringent environmental requirements than those found in federal law and regulations. 172 While

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 6.
172
This phenomenon of state legislatures codifying federal law as a regulatory “ceiling”—prohibiting state agencies
from adopting more stringent restrictions—dates back all the way to 1975, in the early days of the major federal
statutes. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More
Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1373, 1376
(1995) (discussing Florida’s adoption of a statutory constraint in 1975 and the enactment of either general or sector170
171
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this should be relatively straightforward, the economic analyses and their supporting documents
fail in this simple legal analysis. The economic analyses misinterpret and mischaracterize the
relevant state laws. Though not featured in the Federal Register rulemaking text itself, this
analytical flaw would be clear to Clean Water Act experts, and this failure in turn leads to flaws
in the entire economic analyses and thus in the rulemaking itself.
E.

Flaws in NWPR Economic Analyses’ Discussion of State Laws

State legal jurisdiction is addressed in three different documents that must be read
together to determine how the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis characterizes state legal authority
under the Clean Water Act. These include the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis, the Resource
and Programmatic Assessment for the Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of the
“Waters of the United States”; and Appendix A to the Resource and Programmatic
Assessment. 173 Unfortunately, there is little common definition among the three sources, but
when one can find and compare the data, the flaws become clear. 174

specific statutory constraints in 19 states between 1987 and 1994 alone). In 2013, the Environmental Law Institute
published a 50-state study of such restrictions. Environmental Law Institute, State Constraints: State-Imposed
Limitations on the Authority of Agencies to Regulate Waters Beyond the Scope of the Federal Clean Water Act
(2013), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d23-04.pdf.
173
U.S. EPA and U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Economic Analysis for the Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition
of “Waters of the United States” 28-47 (January 22, 2020), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-01/documents/econ_analysis_-_nwpr.pdf;
U.S. EPA & U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Resource and Programmatic Assessment for the Navigable Waters Protection
Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States” 42-50 (Jan. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-01/documents/rpa_-_nwpr_.pdf;
U.S. EPA & U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Appendices to the Resource and Programmatic Assessment for the Navigable
Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States” 1-88 (Jan. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-01/ documents/rpa_finalappendices.pdf.)
174
The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis and the Resource and Programmatic Assessment refer to numbers of states
that are in certain overlapping categories of jurisdiction without naming the specific states, and the state-by-state
review of laws and regulations in Appendix A do not define how those laws and regulations might be related to
these categories, undermining the use of the categorical “state numbers” in the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis and
the Resource and Programmatic Assessment. The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis creates a state graphic using
categories about current regulation and regulatory authority, some of which can be compared to the specific law and
regulations in Appendix A of that analysis.
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In exploring the likelihood of the states and tribes asserting jurisdiction over waters that
would no longer be classified as WOTUS, the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis divides the states
into three categories: a) states that will assert state jurisdiction to maintain an equivalent
regulatory control of Obama-era WOTUS, b) states that will do nothing, and c) states that may
take some regulatory action, but action that would not fully replace the environmental
protections consistent with federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. 175
This prediction of state action in the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis is ostensibly related
to two particular questions: whether a state currently regulates any intrastate waters beyond its
regulation of federal waters, and whether or not state law or regulation restricts regulation of
waters outside of WOTUS. 176 The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis particularly notes that
“effective [replacement] regulation . . . requires the political capital and fiscal resources to do
so. 177
As source material, the Economic Analysis looks at individual state laws and regulations,
but also at interpretation of these by third party institutions and state agency web postings. 178
This is particularly notable since some of the information outside of specific laws and regulations
include surveys of possible future actions. 179 Named “snapshots,” the categorizations are posted
in Appendix A of the Final Rule’s Resource and Programmatic Assessment for the Proposed
Revised Definition of the “Waters of the United States.” 180

Final Rule Economic Analysis at 34.
Id. at 33-34.
177
Id. at 35,
178
Id. at 36.
179
Id. at 36 n. 41; see also Resource and Programmatic Assessment, supra note 175, at 43. (“The summarized
information does not change or substitute for legal requirements.”)
180
Looking at the scope of authority under Section 404 within states, the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis (“FREA”)
specifically places each of the states into three categories:
175
176
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Using this taxonomy, the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis considers different levels of
estimated costs and benefits from the reduction of federal jurisdiction on surface waters and
wetlands (i.e., reduction in costs associated with less regulation, as well as reduction in benefits
from a decrease in environmental protection). This cost-benefit analysis is, of course, dependent
on the agencies’ ability to make an accurate determination as to the category of each state’s legal
authority and likely action. That determination is in turn dependent on two agency conclusions
that were ultimately based on a cascade of flawed assumptions. First, for purposes of this
categorization, the agencies undertook to define whether a state has a “broad” legal limitation on
regulation beyond federal CWA jurisdiction; and second, the agencies estimated costs and
benefits based on their conclusion as to whether or not those states without “broad” legal
limitations (that currently do not regulate beyond federal jurisdiction) would actually take action
to assert increased regulatory authority after implementation of the new, reduced WOTUS
jurisdiction.
The possible outcomes that are drawn from these categorizations about whether certain
states will take over regulation of previously designated WOTUS are flawed in two ways. First,
the assumption that some states currently not prohibited from expanding jurisdiction will do so is
not supported by evidence or economic theory. Second, a close examination of the assumptions
in the Economic Analysis and its supporting Resource and Programmatic Assessment compared
a)

states that have “broad” legal limitations on regulation of aquatic resources or does not have a state
level dredge and fill program;
b) states that have a state level dredge and fill program that does not regulate beyond current federal
WOTUS jurisdiction but is not prohibited by law from doing so; and
c) states that have a state level dredge and fill program AND regulates “waters of the state” beyond
federal CWA jurisdiction.
The FREA then posits the states potential response for the WOTUS final rule as respectively:
a) “unlikely to increase state regulatory practices,”
b) “likely to continue state program and may choose to provide increased state coverage”, and
c) “likely to continue program that already regulates beyond CWA current jurisdiction.”
Final Rule Economic Analysis, Table II-1.
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to the list of specific state laws and regulations indicates that some of the categorizations
themselves are incorrect, including the identification of states currently regulating surface
waters, what constitutes a “broad” legal limitation against stricter-than-federal regulation, and
even statutory legal mischaracterization.
For example, the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis for Section 404 permits names 24
states as “regulating waters more broadly than the CWA requires,” 181 even though a report from
the Environmental Law Institute with a fifty-state survey of relevant legislation indicates that
most of these states are also subject to restrictions that would keep them from regulating beyond
federal jurisdiction. 182 Fuller examples of categories of problems are set out in an Appendix to
this Article. 183 The upshot of these mistaken understandings of state authority is that the costbenefit analysis in the NWPR Rule fails to consider the economic value of wetlands conservation
in areas where wetlands are likely to be lost.
In summary, when one can piece together the multiple analyses and cross references,
admittedly a complex task, it is exceedingly clear that at its core, the NWPR’s claim of a positive
net benefit is false. Presented in the Federal Register notice as undisputed data, it turns out that
the rulemaking, like the storied Emperor, has no clothes. 184

IV.

Conclusion: Presidential Guidance and Reforming Regulatory Impact Analysis

Final Rule’s Economic Analysis Table II-2, p. 40-41.
Environmental Law Institute, supra note 172.
183
See infra, Appendix: Examples of Data Problems in the NWPR’s Supporting Documents.
184
Cf. Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor’s New Clothes.
181
182
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This NWPR case study demonstrates that close scrutiny of the data supporting agencies’
regulatory impact analysis is critical to really understand what is occurring in our administrative
state. For over 40 years, Presidents—both Democratic and Republican—have required that all
major administrative actions undergo a reasoned analysis of their costs and benefits. While there
have been objections to this process, almost all agree that at least in theory, regulatory decisions
should be made such that the benefits to society outweigh the costs.
Unfortunately, this requirement, much as other procedural analyses required of agencies
(such as the Paperwork Reduction Act) is often relegated to the fringes of the rulemaking
process. Although the bottom-line numbers from cost-benefit analysis will appear in publicfacing Federal Register notices, the assumptions behind those number-crunching efforts are
rarely front-and-center. Agency decisions about how to conduct regulatory impact analysis—
including what data to gather and how to make sense of it—are made in relative obscurity.
Determining where potential vulnerabilities in a rulemaking may lie under the arbitrary and
capricious test is essential both for challengers in litigation that oppose agency decisions as well
as for the agency attorneys defending those decisions. Without taking a closer look at the raw
data and the choices made in analyzing that data, it can be difficult for administrative lawyers to
find the types of errors like those illustrated in the NWPR, such as reliance on faulty legal
assumptions in making economic cost and benefit calculations. The problem is likely not limited
to the Trump Administration’s regulatory rollbacks, but without the ability to easily assess
agencies’ supporting studies, we can’t know.
What, then, should be done? President Biden’s January 2021 memorandum includes,
notably, the call to “identify reforms that will promote the efficiency, transparency, and
inclusiveness of the interagency review process, and determine an appropriate approach with
43
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respect to the review of guidance documents.” 185 Government-wide guidelines in OMB Circular
A-4 and agency-specific procedures attempt to provide a framework for uniformity in regulatory
impact analysis. 186 However, the NWPR process highlights some of the critical gaps in these
efforts. In multiple ways, the EPA & Army Corps’ Economic Analyses fell short of the
Circular’s standards for transparency and economic analysis. 187 And yet, with regard to perhaps
the most significant error—mischaracterization of state laws that restrict regulatory authority—
the Circular and EPA Guidelines themselves fail to provide a standardized oversight method. 188
We suggest that the President should use their Executive authority to require a more
transparent process with respect to agency regulatory impact analysis requirements—especially
when economic analysis will be reliant on contingent questions of federalism, state law, or other
legal and policy assumptions. OMB Circular A-4 indicates the following:
A good analysis is transparent. It should be possible for a qualified third party
reading the report to see clearly how you arrived at your estimates and
conclusions. For transparency's sake, you should state in your report what
assumptions were used, such as the time horizon for the analysis and the discount
rates applied to future benefits and costs. It is usually necessary to provide a
sensitivity analysis to reveal whether, and to what extent, the results of the
analysis are sensitive to plausible changes in the main assumptions and numeric
inputs. 189

Presidential Memorandum, Modernizing Regulatory Review, sec. 2(b)(iv), 86 FED. REG. 7223 (Jan. 26, 2021).
See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
187
See E-EEAC Report, supra note 161.
188
See id. at 26.
189
OMB Circular A-4 at 3 (emphasis added).
185
186
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Nothing in the APA nor most agencies’ enabling acts would prevent the President from
ordering that data on the existing and contingent law and policy assumptions underlying any
cost-benefit analysis be put in a uniform format. This could be positioned either as an element in
a follow-on Executive Order that amends the regulatory impact analysis requirement or as part of
a reformed successor to OMB Circular A-4.
The Trump Administration’s NWPR Rule did make cursory mention of the issues of state
authority and the potential range of avoided costs and avoided benefits under different scenarios
of state replacement regulation. 190 However, administrative law attorneys reading the agencies’
official explanation of the rule in the Federal Register would not be able to ascertain the extent of
the assumptions made—nor the sensitivity of the cost-benefit analysis and the magnitude of any
errors due to mistakes in this assumptions—without taking a deep dive into several technical
accompanying documents.
A requirement that any analyses incorporate all data (rather than having multiple references
to prior economic analyses) and into what is presented in the rulemaking itself would allow for
better oversight of regulatory impact analysis and agency cost-benefit estimates. In turn,
attorneys who regularly scan and analyze notice and comment rulemaking would be better
apprised of the actual decision-making process behind agency actions, and could challenge such
as appropriate under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. Presumably this would also
lead to less arbitrary and capricious decision-making as a whole.
In the case of the NWPR, differing definitions across multiple economic analyses and various
supporting documents require a full legal and economics team just to understand the intersection

190

NWPR Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 22,334.
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of federalism, water ecology, and economics behind the bottom line cost-benefit estimates about
what is being done. Reform should induce the agencies to provide one economic analysis with
appropriate definitions and data, explicit in its reliance on assumptions about policy and law,
available in one location.
Such transparency should be an unalloyed positive for the goals of efficiency in government.
Our administrative state is designed to inform the public and seek their guidance. Rather than
asking that public to buy a car based only on its outside appearance—requiring that they hire
their own mechanic if they hope to understand what they are getting—let’s require every
“vehicle” sold by the executive branch to have uniform reporting requirements on what is under
the hood. This way we can more easily use administrative law to get rid of the lemons and
embrace the good deals.
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APPENDIX: Examples of Data Problems in the NWPR’s Supporting Documents

1. Which States currently regulate surface waters which would not meet the 2019 or pre2015 WOTUS definition? [waters that would no longer be federal] 191
While the Resource and Programmatic Assessment’s Appendix A notes whether a state
“may” regulate more surface waters than WOTUS (such as “state waters”) it doesn’t contain
information about whether that particular state does so or not, meaning that the Economic
Analysis, along with its Resource and Programmatic Assessment and the Associated Appendix A
does not provide sufficient data to support one of the key data points used to categorize the
states: whether a state currently regulates waters beyond federal waters. This means that the
Economic Analyses assumptions about which states might have “broader baseline regulation”
than the federal government would thus not be affected (by foregone benefits) with reduction in
federal jurisdiction in an economic analysis. 192
Additionally, in determining whether states regulate beyond federal law, the Resource
and Programmatic Analysis notes that many states regulate groundwater, 193 which is generally
not subject to jurisdiction under the CWA except in limited circumstances. 194 If this is a factor

The repeal of the WOTUS rule of 2015 was finalized (though litigated) in 2019. Until the finalization and
implementation of the proposed WOTUS (2020) this means that the 2019 jurisdictional definition returned to the
pre-2015 jurisdictional definition.
192
Final Rule’s Economic Analysis, at p. 44 (“[S]tate-level baseline regulations may be broader than the federal
requirements. In this case . . . states may simply maintain their broader, baseline regulations.”)
193
Resource and Programmatic Assessment 44-45.
194
See generally County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 590 U.S. ____(2020), see slip op. at
https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/18-260_5i36_scotus-maui.pdf
191
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used to determine “regulating beyond the federal jurisdiction” it would seem inapposite to the
question at hand, which concerns surface waters.
This supposition relies heavily on some categorizations of states as determined in a
detailed 2013 Environmental Law Institute (“ELI”) study analyzing state water regulation after
federal jurisdiction was potentially limited by the S.W.A.N.C.C. and Rapanos decisions. 195 The
rulemaking does so even as the study itself notes:
It is vexing to try to determine with precision which states presently [as of 2013] protect
waters that are no longer subject to federal regulation (or whose regulation under the
federal Clean Water Act has become uncertain), and what those categories of waters are. .
. . [C]oming up with a definitive, water-by-water answer has proven elusive for various
reasons. 196
Claiming to rely on this ELI report, the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis for 404 permits
names 24 states as “regulating waters more broadly than the CWA requires,” even though the
ELI report clarifies that most of these states also are subject to restrictions which would keep
them from regulating beyond federal jurisdiction. 197 According to the ELI report, as of 2013,
only eight states can be considered to regulate more than the federal CWA (post-Rapanos) that
do not have other restrictions against regulating more than the federal jurisdiction. 198 These

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
196
State Constraints: State –Imposed Limitations on the Authroity of Agencies to Regulate Waters Beyond the Scope
of the Federal Clean Water Act, (Environmental Law Institute 2013) at 31-32, available at
https://www.eli.org/research-report/state-constraints-state-imposed-limitations-authority-agencies-regulate-waters.
197
Final Rule’s Economic Analysis Table II-2, p. 40-41.
198
In addition to laws, regulations and/or executive orders that could deter state’s taking on greater regulatory
jurisdiction, the ELI study also notes that many states have property restrictions that go beyond federal law in which
a state might have to compensate private property owners, affected by regulation, even beyond a Constitutional
requirement. While this of course does not prohibit a state from expanding regulatory jurisdiction, it also suggests a
deterrence for that to occur. ELI Report at 20-30.
195
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include California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. 199 And even within these states, the ELI report does not indicate the extent
of possible “greater” regulation or through what regulatory mechanism it occurs. 200
1. What constitutes “broad legal limitation”?
The economic analyses define a legal limitation as a “state prohibiting by law or
requiring additional justification” for imposing regulatory requirements beyond federal
jurisdiction. 201 The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis then uses this definition to determine which
states might fit into the “uncertain” to regulate category under the Section 404 program (states
that are not prohibited from exceeding federal jurisdiction) or states which are prohibited from
regulating more surface waters than determined by WOTUS under the Section 402 NPDES
program. 202 This in turn directly feeds into whether or not “foregone benefits” are “unknown” in
Figure III-1 (for the Section 402 NPDES program) of the final rule economic analysis, or
whether states will be “less protective” of non-WOTUS wetlands in figure III-2 (for the Section
404 wetlands fill program). 203 Many of these determinations are incorrect.
Although the idea of what constitutes a “legal limitation” might seem clear, the term
“broad legal limitation” used in the EPA’s categorization is not uniformly defined in the various

Id. at 34.
E.g. some of the increased regulation is through state action on specific 401 permits, which are ad hoc and not
systematic regulation. Id. at 32. The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis references criticism of some of the
categorizations in the 2013 E.L.I. report indicating that the Agencies’ proposal might not be correct in relying on it.
Final Rule’s Economic Analysis, p. 37 at FN 45. Nonetheless, the Final Rule alters the categories and focus of the
ELI report it seems to rely on its veracity. Criticisms of the report in a comment to the 2015 WOTUS rule, are
generally not applicable to the underlying question being asked in the Economic Analysis, i.e. which states would or
would not regulate beyond federal jurisdiction if that were to shrink. See Comments of the Waters Advocacy
Coalition on the Environmental Protection Agency’s and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Proposed Rule to
Define “Waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880, at
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D-=EPA-HQ-2011-0880-14568.
201
Final Rule Economic Analysis, at 39, 42.
202
Id. at 41, 44 47.
203
Id. at 58, 74.
199
200
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documents. In the classifications in the figures of the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis, it appears
that a “broad” legal limitation might only encompass situations in which a state explicitly
prohibits exceedance of federal standards generally by statute. If that is the case, as a factor for
determining possible future state action, this appears under-representative given federalism
theory and what we know of state environmental actions.
2. Specific Legal Data Mischaracterization
The potential discrepancies between certain state categorizations in the Final Rule’s
Economic Analysis, and the actual laws and regulations of that state as set out in Appendix A of
the Programmatic Assessment are numerous and are described below:
i. In the Economic Analysis, Colorado is categorized as “not having broad legal
limitations,” yet Colorado law notes that Colorado cannot regulate return agricultural
flow more extensively than under federal law, and the water quality control
commission can only adopt rules more stringent than enforceable federal
requirements after a public hearing, finding, and demonstration. 204 This would meet
both the standard of a state prohibiting by law directly and also requiring additional
justification. While this may not apply to every part of the CWA, it is significant, and
under federalism theories would suggest that Colorado is not likely to enlarge
jurisdiction if it is based on the presence of state limitations.
ii. Though this is not stated explicitly in the Final Rule’s Economic Analysis, it is
apparent that the Analysis uses the group of states (24) identified in the 2013 ELI
analysis as regulating “waters more broadly than the CWA requires.” As noted
above, however, the “waters” in this analysis for many states includes regulation of
groundwater or waters in a Coastal Zone that are inapplicable to the question of
whether a state would increase surface water regulation under state law in the face of
shrinking federal jurisdiction. Moreover, this does not take into account statutory
204

Colo. Rev. Stat. Session 25-8-504 and Colo. Rev. Stat. section 25-8-104.
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limitations that may limit that expansion. Even where a state may currently regulate
waters more broadly than federal regulation (8 are identified in the 2013 ELI study) it
is impossible to tell from that study the extent of state regulation or whether the
relevant state authority would relate to expanding jurisdiction if federal jurisdiction
were to decrease.
iii. In the Economic Analysis, Florida is categorized as “not having broad legal
limitations.” However, Florida law requires that no standards can be set above
federal standards unless additional requirements and findings occur, along with a
high-level executive branch review. 205 This is mistakenly characterized in Appendix
A as “allowing regulations to exceed federal regulations if they are in counterpoise.”
This comes from a 1978 case in state court examining what kinds of regulatory
comparisons can even be sent to the high-level executive committee by review. 206
The language taken from the case is meant to imply that a comparison of whether or
not a Florida regulation exceeds a federal one is only possible when the federal and
state regulations are comparable. In this case, counterpoise refers to situations in
which the federal and state laws are subject to exact comparison. 207
iv. While Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wyoming all have state dredge and fill programs as
indicated in the economic analysis, 208 none have a “no net loss of wetlands” policy, 209
meaning that even if certain wetlands meet state jurisdiction but were not WOTUS,
that they would not necessarily be protected, leading to potential loss of benefits that
could be higher than in a state which lacks the authority to regulate beyond WOTUS.
v. The Final Rule Economic Analysis chart indicates that Indiana does not have “broad
legal limitations.” However, after passage of HB 1082 into law in 2016, all
environmental rules more stringent than federal rules are subject to legislative veto:
they cannot go into effect until the end of the next legislative session, giving state
Fla. Stat. Ann. Sec. 403.061(7).
Florida Elec. Power Coordinating Group, Inc. v. Askew, 366 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist.
1978).
207
Id.
208
Final Rule Economic Analysis, Table II-2 at p. 40.
209
See Resources and Programmatic Assessment, Appendix A, pp. 14, 23, 24, 29, 31, 39, 57, 66, 73, and 87.
205
206
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lawmakers an opportunity to overrule them. 210 Additionally, Indiana Code 13-14-9-8
(h) specifies that when federal law or regulations become less stringent, state law
automatically shrinks as well:
[If] a proposed rule is adopted . . . and the federal law, rule, or regulation on
which the adopted rule is based is later repealed or otherwise nullified by
legislative or administrative action, then that part of the adopted rule that
corresponds to the repealed or nullified federal law, rule, or regulation is void as
of the effective date of the legislative or administrative action repealing or
otherwise nullifying the federal law, rule, or regulation[.] 211
This language indicates that Indiana does indeed have a policy to not exceed
federal environmental standards.
vi. The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis also indicates that Iowa does not have “broad
legal limitations,” but there are laws preventing more state stringent water quality
effluent standards, 212 and special administrative procedures required for increased
stringency over any implementation of federal rules or environmental standards. 213
vii. The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis indicates that Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia do not have “broad
legal limitations,” but Maine, Michigan, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia
have laws, and Maryland operates under a 24 year old executive order, that require
additional administrative justification and/or findings if the state agency chooses to
impose a rule more stringent that federal requirements. 214 Nevada also is listed as
having no “broad legal limitations” but is under requirement for additional procedures
if a state regulation will be more stringent than the federal regulation. 215

Ind. HB 1062 (2016), available at http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2016/bills/house/1082#, codified at IND. CODE §
13-14-9-4(c). See Council of State Governments, at https://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/qom-0317.aspx.
211
IND. CODE § 13-14-9-8(h)(1).
212
Iowa Code 455B.171.
213
Iowa Code 455B.105(3).
214
Me. Stat. tit. 38, section 341-H(3); Mich. Comp. Laws, Sec.24.232 and 24.245; Md. Exec. Order No.
01.01.1996.03 (1996); N.D. Cent. Code section 23-01-04.1.; Okla. Stat. tit. 27A, section 1-1-206; Utah Code § 19-5105; Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-44.15.1, 62.1-44.15(3a) and (10), and 62.1-44.19:7(B); W.Va. Code §§ 22-5-4 and 221-3a.
215
Resource and Programmatic Assessment, Appendix A, at 50.
210
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viii.

The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis also categorizes New Jersey as having “no

broad legal limitation” prohibiting regulation beyond federal law. 216 However, a
1994 New Jersey executive order requires additional procedures and the substantive
justification of a cost-benefit analysis in order for the state agency to regulate beyond
federal standards, and a 2010 executive order prohibits New Jersey from regulating
beyond federal law except in limited circumstances. 217
ix. The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis also categorizes Oregon as having “no broad
legal limitation” prohibiting regulation beyond federal law. 218 However, Oregon has
a blanket administrative procedures rule that instructs that Oregon regulations be
equivalent to federal ones unless certain exceptions apply. 219
x. The Final Rule’s Economic Analysis also categorizes Tennessee as having “no broad
legal limitation” prohibiting regulation beyond federal law. 220 Tennessee does,
however, require special procedures and justifications if the state rules would increase
costs on local government. 221

NWPR Final Rule Economic Analysis Table II-1 at p. 40
N.J. Exec. Order No. 27 (Gov. Whitman), Nov. 2, 1994; N.J. Exec. Order No. 2 (Gov. Christie), Jan. 20, 2010.
218
NWPR Final Rule Economic Analysis Table II-1 at p. 40.
219
Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.332.
220
NWPR Final Rule Economic Analysis Table II-1 at p. 40.
221
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-226(k).
216
217
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